Questões de Concursos

When a person (or team or firm or government) decides how to act in dealings with other people (or teams or firms or governments), there must be some cross-effect of their actions; what one does must affect the outcome for the other. For the interaction to become a strategic game, however, we need the participants’ mutual awareness of this cross-effect. What the other person does affects you; if you know this, you can react to his actions, or take advance actions to forestall the bad effects his future actions may have on you and to facilitate any good effects, or even take advance actions so as to alter his future reactions toyour advantage. If you know that the other person knows that what you do affects him, you know that he will be taking similar actions. And so on. It is this mutual awareness of the cross-effects of actions and the actions taken as a result of this awareness that constitute the most interesting aspects of strategy.

When each participant is significant in the interaction, either because each is a large player to start with or because commitments or private information narrow the scope of the relationship to a point where each is an important player within the relationship, we must think of the interaction as a strategic game. Such situations are the rule rather than the exception in business, in politics, and even in social interactions. Therefore, the study of strategic games forms an important part of all fields that analyze these matters.

Avinash Dixit et al. Games of strategy.

New York: W.W. Norton & Coadapted, 2015 (adapted).

When a person (or team or firm or government) decides how to act in dealings with other people (or teams or firms or governments), there must be some cross-effect of their actions; what one does must affect the outcome for the other. For the interaction to become a strategic game, however, we need the participants’ mutual awareness of this cross-effect. What the other person does affects you; if you know this, you can react to his actions, or take advance actions to forestall the bad effects his future actions may have on you and to facilitate any good effects, or even take advance actions so as to alter his future reactions toyour advantage. If you know that the other person knows that what you do affects him, you know that he will be taking similar actions. And so on. It is this mutual awareness of the cross-effects of actions and the actions taken as a result of this awareness that constitute the most interesting aspects of strategy.

When each participant is significant in the interaction, either because each is a large player to start with or because commitments or private information narrow the scope of the relationship to a point where each is an important player within the relationship, we must think of the interaction as a strategic game. Such situations are the rule rather than the exception in business, in politics, and even in social interactions. Therefore, the study of strategic games forms an important part of all fields that analyze these matters.

Avinash Dixit et al. Games of strategy.

New York: W.W. Norton & Coadapted, 2015 (adapted).

When a person (or team or firm or government) decides how to act in dealings with other people (or teams or firms or governments), there must be some cross-effect of their actions; what one does must affect the outcome for the other. For the interaction to become a strategic game, however, we need the participants’ mutual awareness of this cross-effect. What the other person does affects you; if you know this, you can react to his actions, or take advance actions to forestall the bad effects his future actions may have on you and to facilitate any good effects, or even take advance actions so as to alter his future reactions toyour advantage. If you know that the other person knows that what you do affects him, you know that he will be taking similar actions. And so on. It is this mutual awareness of the cross-effects of actions and the actions taken as a result of this awareness that constitute the most interesting aspects of strategy.

When each participant is significant in the interaction, either because each is a large player to start with or because commitments or private information narrow the scope of the relationship to a point where each is an important player within the relationship, we must think of the interaction as a strategic game. Such situations are the rule rather than the exception in business, in politics, and even in social interactions. Therefore, the study of strategic games forms an important part of all fields that analyze these matters.

Avinash Dixit et al. Games of strategy.

New York: W.W. Norton & Coadapted, 2015 (adapted).

The philosopher Jeremy Bentham was regarded as the founder of utilitarianism and a leading advocate of the separation of church and state, freedom of expression, and individual legal rights. Furthermore, the “panopticon” is a type of institutional building that has long dominated Bentham’s legacy. As a work of architecture, the panopticon allows a watchman in a central tower to observe occupants of surrounding cells without the occupants knowing whether or not they are being watched. As a metaphor, the panopticon was commandeered in the latter half of the 20th century as a way to trace the surveillance tendencies of disciplinarian societies. Is it still a useful way to think about surveillance today?

The French philosopher Michel Foucault used the idea of the panopticon as a way to illustrate the proclivity of disciplinary societies to subjugate its citizens. He describes the prisoner of a panopticon as being at the receiving end of asymmetrical surveillance: “He is seen, but he does not see.” As a consequence, the inmate polices himself for fear of punishment.

The parallels between the panopticon and surveillance cameras may be obvious, but what happens when you step into the world of digital surveillance and data capture? Unlike the panopticon, citizens don’t know they are being watched. Jake Goldenfein, from the University of Melbourne, tells me it’s important to remember the corrective purposes of Bentham’s panopticon when considering it as a metaphor for modern surveillance. “The relevance of the panopticon as a metaphor begins to wither when we start thinking about whether contemporary types of visuality are analogous to the central tower concept. For example, whether this type of visuality is as asymmetrical, and being co-opted for the same political exercise.” In the panopticon the occupants are constantly aware of the threat of being watched — this is the whole point — but state surveillance on the Internet is invisible; there is no looming tower, no dead-eye lens staring at you every time you enter a URL. There may not be a central tower, but there will be communicating sensors in our most intimate objects.

Internet: <theguardian.com> (adapted).