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1461Q943134 | Espanhol, Segunda Fase, UECE, UECE CEV, 2021

Señala la palabra separada correctamente.
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1462Q943189 | Inglês, Segunda Fase, UECE, UECE CEV, 2021

Texto associado.

The World Might Be Running Low on Americans


The world has been stricken by scarcity. Our post-pandemic pantry has run bare of gasoline, lumber, microchips, chicken wings, ketchup packets, cat food, used cars and Chickfil-A sauce. Like the Great Toilet Paper Scare of 2020, though, many of these shortages are the consequence of near-term, Covid-related disruptions. Soon enough there will again be a chicken wing in every pot and more than enough condiments to go with it.


But there is one recently announced potential shortage that should give Americans great reason for concern. It is a shortfall that the nation has rarely had to face, and nobody quite knows how things will work when we begin to run out.


I speak, of course, of all of us: The world may be running low on Americans — most crucially, tomorrow’s working-age, childbearing, idea-generating, community-building young Americans. Late last month, the Census Bureau released the first results from its 2020 count, and the numbers confirmed what demographers have been warning of for years: The United States is undergoing “demographic stagnation,” transitioning from a relatively fast-growing country of young people to a slow-growing, older nation.


Many Americans might consider slow growth a blessing. Your city could already be packed to the gills, the roads clogged with traffic and housing prices shooting through the roof. Why do we need more folks? And, anyway, aren’t we supposed to be conserving resources on a planet whose climate is changing? Yet demographic stagnation could bring its own high costs, among them a steady reduction in dynamism, productivity and a slowdown in national and individual prosperity, even a diminishment of global power.


And there is no real reason we have to endure such a transition, not even an environmental one. Even if your own city is packed like tinned fish, the U.S. overall can accommodate millions more people. Most of the counties in the U.S. are losing working-age adults; if these declines persist, local economies will falter, tax bases will dry up, and localgovernments will struggle to maintain services. Growth is not just an option but a necessity — it’s not just that we can afford to have more people, it may be that we can’t afford not to.


But how does a country get more people? There are two ways: Make them, and invite them in. Increasing the first is relatively difficult — birthrates are declining across the world, and while family-friendly policies may be beneficial for many reasons, they seem to do little to get people to have more babies. On the second method, though, the United States enjoys a significant advantage — people around the globe have long been clamoring to live here, notwithstanding our government’s recent hostility to foreigners. This fact presents a relatively simple policy solution to a vexing long-term issue: America needs more people, and the world has people to send us. All we have to do is let more of them in.


For decades, the United States has enjoyed a significant economic advantage over other industrialized nations — our population was growing faster, which suggested a more youthful and more prosperous future. But in the last decade, American fertility has gone down. At the same time, there has been a slowdown in immigration.


The Census Bureau’s latest numbers show that these trends are catching up with us. As of April 1, it reports that there were 331,449,281 residents in the United States, an increase of just 7.4 percent since 2010 — the second-smallest decade-long growth rate ever recorded, only slightly ahead of the 7.3 percent growth during the Depression-struck 1930s.


The bureau projects that sometime next decade — that is, in the 2030s — Americans over 65 will outnumber Americans younger than 18 for the first time in our history. The nation will cross the 400-million population mark sometime in the late 2050s, but by then we’ll be quite long in the tooth — about half of Americans will be over 45, and one fifth will be older than 85.


The idea that more people will lead to greater prosperity may sound counterintuitive — wouldn’t more people just consume more of our scarce resources? Human history generally refutes this simple intuition. Because more people usually make for more workers, more companies, and most fundamentally, more new ideas for pushing humanity forward, economic studies suggest that population growth is often an important catalyst of economic growth.


A declining global population might be beneficial in some ways; fewer people would most likely mean less carbon emission, for example — though less than you might think, since leading climate models already assume slowing population growth over the coming century. And a declining population could be catastrophic in other ways. In a recent paper, Chad Jones, an economist at Stanford, argues that a global population decline could reduce the fundamental innovativeness of humankind. The theory issimple: Without enough people, the font of new ideas dries up, Jones argues; without new ideas, progress could be imperiled.


There are more direct ways that slow growth can hurt us. As a country’s population grows heavy with retiring older people and light with working younger people, you get a problem of too many eaters and too few cooks. Programs for seniors like Social Security and Medicare may suffer as they become dependent on ever-fewer working taxpayers for funding. Another problem is the lack of people to do all the work. For instance, experts predict a major shortage of health care workers, especially home care workers, who will be needed to help the aging nation.


In a recent report, Ali Noorani, the chief executive of the National Immigration Forum, an immigration-advocacy group, and a co-author, Danilo Zak, say that increasing legal immigration by slightly more than a third each year would keep America’s ratio of working young people to retired old people stable over the next four decades.


As an immigrant myself, I have to confess I find much of the demographic argument in favor of greater immigration quite a bit too anodyne. Immigrants bring a lot more to the United States than simply working-age bodies for toiling in pursuit of greater economic growth. I also believe that the United States’ founding idea of universal equality will never be fully realized until we recognize that people outside our borders are as worthy of our ideals as those here through an accident of birth.

In “… if these declines persist, local economies will falter, tax bases will dry up, and local governments will struggle to maintain services.” there is a/an
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1463Q679515 | Matemática, Áreas e Perímetros, Matemática 1° Dia, UECE, UECE CEV, 2019

Um losango está circunscrito a uma circunferência cuja medida do raio é igual a 4,8 m. Se a medida da área do losango é igual a 96 m2, então, é correto concluir que o comprimento do lado desse losango, em metros, é igual a
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1464Q946823 | Biologia, Gimnospermas e Angiospermas, Biologia, UECE, UECE CEV, 2019

As angiospermas são plantas
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1465Q943258 | História e Geografia de Estados e Municípios, Segunda Fase, UECE, UECE CEV, 2021

Leia atentamente o seguinte excerto sobre Virgolino Ferreira da Silva, o Lampião: “Mossoró, no Rio Grande do Norte, foi a maior cidade atacada por Virgolino Ferreira da Silva. Sua ação mais ousada — e sua maior derrota. [...] Em 15 de junho de 1927, chegaram a Limoeiro do Norte, no Vale do Jaguaribe, Ceará, dois dias após deixarem Mossoró. Lampião enviou mensageiro para avisar de sua chegada. A polícia, então, deixou a cidade. O bando entrou em Limoeiro dando vivas ao Governador José Moreira da Rocha [...]. Os chefes políticos mataram um boi para recepcionar os bandidos. O bando comeu, fez orações. A contribuição em dinheiro foi acertada com os líderes locais. Após o pagamento, o bando de Lampião se retirou. [...]”
O Povo online. Ceará foi o refúgio seguro de Lampião. 27/07/2018.
A atitude de certa forma benevolente de Lampião em relação ao estado do Ceará, tornando-o o local que menos sofreu violência de seu bando deve-se
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1466Q945570 | Geografia, Segundo Semestre, UECE, UECE CEV, 2019

Sobre o grande setor agropecuário e alimentar do Brasil, é correto afirmar que
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1467Q950182 | Física, Oscilação e Ondas, Física e Química, UECE, UECE CEV, 2018

Considerando que, em um espelho plano incide um raio de luz, é correto afirmar que
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1468Q943533 | Conhecimentos Gerais, Geografia e História, UECE, UECE CEV, 2021

Leia atentamente o seguinte excerto:

“Nos anos 50 [...] chegou ao apogeu da sua popularidade, sobretudo entre as massas urbanas e os migrantes recém-chegados à cidade grande. [...] Estes filmes cômicos, produzidos principalmente pela Atlântida, conseguiram articular as transformações socioculturais testemunhadas pelo povo durante uma década caracterizada por um crescimento econômico dramático e pela intensificação dos processos de industrialização, urbanização e migração interna.[...] este gênero refletiu os efeitos que a modernidade e a expansão capitalista produziram nas classes populares, e que ajudou os marginalizados, particularmente os migrantes alienados, a se adaptarem à vida urbana. [...] o povo podia identificar-se com os protagonistas e as experiências deles na cidade”.

SHAW, Lisa. The Brazilian … of the 1950s and Notions of Popular Identity. Luso-Brasilian Review. v. 38, nº1, 2001. University of Wisconsin Press.

Assinale a opção que corresponde ao fenômeno cultural originado no fim dos anos 1940, que teve seu apogeu dos anos 1950 até o início da década de 1960, a que o excerto acima se refere.

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1469Q943086 | Biologia, Uma visão geral da célula, Prova de Conhecimentos Gerais, UECE, UECE CEV, 2021

De acordo com a hipótese endossimbiótica, é correto afirmar que
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1470Q943358 | Educação Física, Primeira Fase OAB, UECE, UECE CEV, 2021

A Qualidade de vida se tornou, para a maioria das pessoas, uma meta a ser alcançada. Entende-se por qualidade de vida, de acordo com a Organização Mundial da Saúde,
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1471Q943374 | Inglês, Primeira Fase OAB, UECE, UECE CEV, 2021

Texto associado.

T E X T

Men Fall Behind in College Enrollment.

Women Still Play Catch-Up at Work.


The coronavirus upended the lives of millions of college students. The Wall Street Journal reported this week that men have been hit particularly hard — accounting for roughly three-fourths of pandemic-driven dropouts — and depicted an accelerating crisis in male enrollment.

A closer look at historical trends and the labor market reveals a more complex picture, one in which women keep playing catch-up in an economy structured to favor men.

In many ways, the college gender imbalance is not new. Women have outnumbered men on campus since the late 1970s. The ratio of female to male undergraduates increased much more from 1970 to 1980 than from 1980 to the present. And the numbers haven’t changed much in recent decades. In 1992, 55 percent of college students were women. By 2019, the number had nudged up to 57.4 percent.

While the shift in the college gender ratio is often characterized as men “falling behind,” men are actually more likely to go to college today than they were when they were the majority, many decades ago. In 1970, 32 percent of men 18 to 24were enrolled in college, a level that was most likely inflated by the opportunity to avoid being drafted into the Vietnam War. That percentage dropped to 24 percent in 1978 and then steadily grew to a stable 37 percent to 39 percent over the last decade.

The gender ratio mostly changed because female enrollment increased even faster, more than doubling over the last half-century.

Because of the change in ratio, some selective colleges discriminate against women in admissions to maintain a gender balance, as The Journal reported. Generally, admissions officials prefer to limit the disparity to 55 percent female and 45 percent male. Their reason not to let the gender ratio drift further toward 2 to 1 is straightforward: Such a ratio would most likely cause a decrease in applications.

In a New York Times essay in 2006 titled “To All the Girls I’ve Rejected,” the dean of admissions at Kenyon College at the time explained: “Beyond the availability of dance partners for the winter formal, gender balance matters in ways both large and small on a residential college campus. Once you become decidedly female in enrollment, fewer males and, as it turns out, fewer females find your campus attractive.”

The raw numbers don’t take into account the varying value of college degrees. Men still dominate in fields like technology and engineering, which offer some of the highest salaries for recent graduates. Perhaps not coincidentally, the professors in those fields remain overwhelmingly male.

Women surged into college because they were able to, but also because many had to. There are still some good-paying jobs available to men without college credentials. There are relatively few for such women. And despite the considerable cost in time and money of earning a degree, many female-dominated jobs don’t pay well.

The fact that the male-female wage gap remains large after more than four decades in which women outnumbered men in college strongly suggests that college alone offers a narrow view of opportunity. Women often seem stuck in place: As they overcome obstacles and use their degrees to move into male-dominated fields, the fields offer less pay in return.

None of this diminishes the significance of the male decrease in college enrollment and graduation. Educators view the male-driven dive in community college enrollment over the last 18 months as a calamity. The pandemic confirmed what was already known. Higher socioeconomic classes are deeply embedded in college and will bear considerable cost and inconvenience to stay there, even if it means watching lectures on a laptop in the room above your parent’s garage and missing a season of parties and football games.

For other people, college attendance is far more fragile. It does not define their identities and is not as important as earning a steady paycheck or starting and nurturing a family. In a time of crisis,it can be delayed — but the reality is that people who drop out of college are statistically unlikely to complete a degree.

Last year, women were less likely than men to leave community college, despite their disproportionate responsibility for caregiving and domestic work, because they no doubt understood the bleak long-term job prospects for women without a credential.

www.nytimes.com/Sept.9,2021

Statistics show that college dropouts
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1472Q679229 | Matemática, Matemática 2° Fase, UECE, UECE CEV, 2019

Seja U o conjunto de todos os números inteiros positivos menores do que 200. Se

X2= {nU tal que n é múltiplo de 2},

X3= {n∈U tal que n é múltiplo de 3} e

X5= {nU tal que n é múltiplo de 5}, então, o número de elementos de X2uX3uX5 é


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1473Q946505 | Inglês, Língua Inglesa, UECE, UECE CEV, 2019

Texto associado.

T E X T


I Used to Fear Being a Nobody. Then I Left

Social Media.


By Bianca Brooks


“What’s happening?”

I stare blankly at the little box as I try to think of something clever for my first tweet. I settle on what’s at the top of my mind: “My only #fear is being a nobody.” How could I know this exchange would begin a dialogue that would continue nearly every day for the next nine years of my life?

I began using Twitter in 2010 as a newly minted high school freshman. Though it began as a hub for my quirky adolescent thoughts, over the years it became an archive of my emotional and intellectual voice — a kind of virtual display for the evolution of my politics and artistic identity. Butafter nine years, it was time to close the archive. My wanting to share my every waking thought became eclipsed by a desire for an increasingly rare commodity — a private life.

Though I thought disappearing from social media would be as simple as logging off, my refusal to post anything caused a bit of a stir among my small but loyal following. I began to receive emails from strangers asking me where I had gone and when I would return. One message read: “Not to be over familiar, but you have to come back eventually. You’re a writer after all. How will we read your writing?” Another follower inquired, “Where will you go?”

The truth is I have not gone anywhere. I am, in fact, more present than ever

Over time, I have begun to sense these messages reveal more than a lack of respect for privacy. I realize that to many millennials, a life without a social media presence is not simply a private life; it is no life at all: We possess a widespread, genuine fear of obscurity.

When I consider the near-decade I have spent on social media, this worry makes sense. As with many in my generation, Twitter was my entry into conversations happening on a global scale; long before my byline graced any publication, tweeting was how I felt a part of the world. Twitter functions much like an echo chamber dependent on likes and retweets, and gaining notoriety is as easy as finding someone to agree with you. For years I poured my opinions, musings and outrage onto my timeline, believing I held an indispensable place in a vital sociopolitical experiment.

But these passionate, public observations were born of more than just a desire to speak my mind — I was measuring my individual worth in constant visibility. Implicit in my follower’s question “Where will you go?” is the resounding question “How will we know where you’ve gone?” Privacy is considered a small exchange for the security of being well known and well liked.

After all, a private life boasts no location markers or story updates. The idea that the happenings of our lives would be constrained to our immediate families, friends and real-life communities is akin to social death in a world measured by followers, views, likes and shares.

I grow weary when I think of this as the new normal for what is considered to be a fruitful personal life. Social media is no longer a mere public extension of our private socialization; it has become a replacement for it. What happens to our humanity when we relegate our real lives to props for the performance of our virtual ones?

For one, a predominantly online existence can lull us into a dubious sense of having enacted concrete change, simply because of a tweet or Instagram post. As “hashtag activism” has obscured longstanding traditions of assembly and protest, there’s concern that a failure to transition from the keyboard to in-person organization will effectively stall or kill the momentum of political movements. (See: Occupy Wall Street.)

The sanctity of our most intimate experiences is also diminished. My grandfather Charles Shaw — a notable musician whose wisdoms and jazz scene tales I often shared on Twitter — passed away last year. Rather than take adequate time to privately mourn the loss of his giant influence in my life alongside those who loved him most, I quickly posted a lengthy tribute to him to my followers. At the time I thought, “How will they remember him if I don’t acknowledge his passing?”

Perhaps at the root of this anxiety over being forgotten is an urgent question of how one ought to form a legacy; with the rise of automation, a widening wealth gap and an unstable political climate, it is easy to feel unimportant. It is almost as if the world is too big and we are much too small to excel in it in any meaningful way. We feel we need as many people as possible to witness our lives, so as not to be left out of a story that is being written too fast by people much more significant than ourselves.

“The secret of a full life is to live and relate to others as if they might not be there tomorrow, as if you might not be there tomorrow,” the writer Anais Nin said. “This feeling has become a rarity, and rarer every day now that we have reached a hastier and more superficial rhythm, now that we believe we are in touch with a greater amount of people. This is the illusion which might cheat us of being in touch deeply with the one breathing next to us.”

I think of those words and at once any fear of obscurity is eclipsed by much deeper ones — the fear of forgoing the sacred moments of life, of never learning to be completely alone, of not bearing witness to the incredible lives of those who surround me.

I observe the world around me. It is big and moving fast. “What’s happening?” I think to myself.

I’m just beginning to find out.


From:www.nytimes.com/Oct. 1, 2019

The author states that for millennials, social media has become so much part of their lives that somehow it comes to be
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1474Q943179 | Inglês, Segunda Fase, UECE, UECE CEV, 2021

Texto associado.

The World Might Be Running Low on Americans


The world has been stricken by scarcity. Our post-pandemic pantry has run bare of gasoline, lumber, microchips, chicken wings, ketchup packets, cat food, used cars and Chickfil-A sauce. Like the Great Toilet Paper Scare of 2020, though, many of these shortages are the consequence of near-term, Covid-related disruptions. Soon enough there will again be a chicken wing in every pot and more than enough condiments to go with it.


But there is one recently announced potential shortage that should give Americans great reason for concern. It is a shortfall that the nation has rarely had to face, and nobody quite knows how things will work when we begin to run out.


I speak, of course, of all of us: The world may be running low on Americans — most crucially, tomorrow’s working-age, childbearing, idea-generating, community-building young Americans. Late last month, the Census Bureau released the first results from its 2020 count, and the numbers confirmed what demographers have been warning of for years: The United States is undergoing “demographic stagnation,” transitioning from a relatively fast-growing country of young people to a slow-growing, older nation.


Many Americans might consider slow growth a blessing. Your city could already be packed to the gills, the roads clogged with traffic and housing prices shooting through the roof. Why do we need more folks? And, anyway, aren’t we supposed to be conserving resources on a planet whose climate is changing? Yet demographic stagnation could bring its own high costs, among them a steady reduction in dynamism, productivity and a slowdown in national and individual prosperity, even a diminishment of global power.


And there is no real reason we have to endure such a transition, not even an environmental one. Even if your own city is packed like tinned fish, the U.S. overall can accommodate millions more people. Most of the counties in the U.S. are losing working-age adults; if these declines persist, local economies will falter, tax bases will dry up, and localgovernments will struggle to maintain services. Growth is not just an option but a necessity — it’s not just that we can afford to have more people, it may be that we can’t afford not to.


But how does a country get more people? There are two ways: Make them, and invite them in. Increasing the first is relatively difficult — birthrates are declining across the world, and while family-friendly policies may be beneficial for many reasons, they seem to do little to get people to have more babies. On the second method, though, the United States enjoys a significant advantage — people around the globe have long been clamoring to live here, notwithstanding our government’s recent hostility to foreigners. This fact presents a relatively simple policy solution to a vexing long-term issue: America needs more people, and the world has people to send us. All we have to do is let more of them in.


For decades, the United States has enjoyed a significant economic advantage over other industrialized nations — our population was growing faster, which suggested a more youthful and more prosperous future. But in the last decade, American fertility has gone down. At the same time, there has been a slowdown in immigration.


The Census Bureau’s latest numbers show that these trends are catching up with us. As of April 1, it reports that there were 331,449,281 residents in the United States, an increase of just 7.4 percent since 2010 — the second-smallest decade-long growth rate ever recorded, only slightly ahead of the 7.3 percent growth during the Depression-struck 1930s.


The bureau projects that sometime next decade — that is, in the 2030s — Americans over 65 will outnumber Americans younger than 18 for the first time in our history. The nation will cross the 400-million population mark sometime in the late 2050s, but by then we’ll be quite long in the tooth — about half of Americans will be over 45, and one fifth will be older than 85.


The idea that more people will lead to greater prosperity may sound counterintuitive — wouldn’t more people just consume more of our scarce resources? Human history generally refutes this simple intuition. Because more people usually make for more workers, more companies, and most fundamentally, more new ideas for pushing humanity forward, economic studies suggest that population growth is often an important catalyst of economic growth.


A declining global population might be beneficial in some ways; fewer people would most likely mean less carbon emission, for example — though less than you might think, since leading climate models already assume slowing population growth over the coming century. And a declining population could be catastrophic in other ways. In a recent paper, Chad Jones, an economist at Stanford, argues that a global population decline could reduce the fundamental innovativeness of humankind. The theory issimple: Without enough people, the font of new ideas dries up, Jones argues; without new ideas, progress could be imperiled.


There are more direct ways that slow growth can hurt us. As a country’s population grows heavy with retiring older people and light with working younger people, you get a problem of too many eaters and too few cooks. Programs for seniors like Social Security and Medicare may suffer as they become dependent on ever-fewer working taxpayers for funding. Another problem is the lack of people to do all the work. For instance, experts predict a major shortage of health care workers, especially home care workers, who will be needed to help the aging nation.


In a recent report, Ali Noorani, the chief executive of the National Immigration Forum, an immigration-advocacy group, and a co-author, Danilo Zak, say that increasing legal immigration by slightly more than a third each year would keep America’s ratio of working young people to retired old people stable over the next four decades.


As an immigrant myself, I have to confess I find much of the demographic argument in favor of greater immigration quite a bit too anodyne. Immigrants bring a lot more to the United States than simply working-age bodies for toiling in pursuit of greater economic growth. I also believe that the United States’ founding idea of universal equality will never be fully realized until we recognize that people outside our borders are as worthy of our ideals as those here through an accident of birth.

The declining of birthrates is a phenomenon that is happening
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1475Q944205 | História, Geografia e História, UECE, UECE CEV, 2020

Relacione, corretamente, as grandes pandemias ocorridas ao longo da história com suas definições ou características, abaixo apresentadas, numerando os parênteses com a seguinte indicação:
1. Varíola 2. Gripe asiática 3. HIV/Aids 4. Praga de Justiniano
( ) As consequências econômicas foram catastróficas: quatro milhões de pessoas morreram em decorrência da peste bubônica. ( ) Ataca o sistema de imunidade, deixando o organismo indefeso contra doenças. Estima-se que causou cerca de vinte cinco milhões de mortes em todo o mundo. ( ) Doença extremamente contagiosa, foi levada da Europa para América e contaminou massivamente uma população com baixa imunidade a novas doenças. ( ) O vírus, de origem aviária, apareceu no ano de 1957 e, em menos de um ano, espalhou-se por todo o mundo.

A sequência correta, de cima para baixo, é:
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1476Q943238 | Geografia, Clima, Segunda Fase, UECE, UECE CEV, 2021

Leia com atenção a seguinte definição de áreas desérticas:
“Região natural caracterizada pela pequena precipitação de chuvas muito irregular. Nas regiões desérticas quentes temos formas de relevo e alterações de rochas específicas como os ergs, hamadas, regs, rios cuja a rede hidrográfica não tem hierarquização, freikanter, verniz do deserto, grande intensidade de desagregação mecânica, dunas, etc”.
Guerra, A. T. Dicionário geológico-geomorfológico. 8. ed. Rio de Janeiro. 1993.
O trecho acima se refere a uma definição e características de áreas desérticas. Sobre essas feições, é correto dizer que
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1477Q950686 | Biologia, Vírus e bactérias, Segundo Semestre, UECE, UECE CEV, 2018

São exemplos de relações ecológicas interespecíficas desarmônicas:
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1478Q943586 | Biologia, Estudo dos tecidos, Biologia, UECE, UECE CEV, 2021

Os epitélios glandulares podem ser de três tipos: exócrinos, endócrinos ou mistos. A respeito dessas glândulas, é correto dizer que
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1479Q943590 | Biologia, Sistema Digestório Humano, Biologia, UECE, UECE CEV, 2021

O sistema digestório humano, apesar de ser altamente sofisticado, é suscetível a diversos tipos de doenças. No que diz respeito a essas doenças, assinale a afirmação FALSA.
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1480Q943602 | Biologia, Ecologia e ciências ambientais, Biologia, UECE, UECE CEV, 2021

Atente para o que se diz a seguir sobre ecologia:

I. Comunidade é o conjunto de indivíduos da mesma espécie que habitam o mesmo ecossistema.

II. Biomas são classificados pela composição e estrutura da vegetação dominante que reflete as condições climáticas.

III. Os fatores abióticos são representações das interações intraespecíficas e interespecíficas.

IV. Cadeia alimentar é uma sequência linear por meio da qual a matéria e a energia são transferidas de um nível trófico a outro.

É correto o que se afirma em

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